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Withholding Nutrition and
Mistrusting Nurturance: The
Vocabulary of In re Conroy
Robert A. Burt, J.D...
Words are a lawyer's stock in trade and, as every lawyer knows,
words can mislead as much as they can clarify. James Madison, in
number thirty-seven of the Federalist Papers, said it best while ex-
plaining why the words of the Constitution would inevitably be diffi-
cult to interpret. "When the Almighty himself," Madison said, "con-
descends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning,
luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy
medium through which it is communicated."1
Statutes or judicial opinions addressing the "right to die" are also
clouded by these doubts, confused as much as illuminated by the
language that is available for discussing the subject. The very words
used to formulate a question can, moreover, readily contain some
impetus, some bias as it were, toward an answer-a bias that not only
is unintended but that can ultimately defeat the author's professed
initial intention.
This paradoxical difficulty can be seen in a recent decision by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, In re Conroy,2 regarding the termination of
care for seriously ill people. The central issue in that case was whether
the court would authorize physicians at the nursing home where
Claire Conroy lived to discontinue feeding her by withdrawing a
nasogastric tube on which her continued life depended. Though Ms.
'Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University; Professor of Law and Professor of
Law in Psychiatry, joint appointment of Law and Medical School, University of
Michigan, 1970-76; B.A. (magna cum laude) Princeton University, 1960; B.A. in Juris-
prudence, Oxford University, 1962; M.A. in Jurisprudence, Oxford University, 1968;
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Conroy died of other causes while her case proceeded through the
appeals process, the New Jersey Supreme Court nonetheless set out an
elaborate framework to govern future cases like hers. Within that
framework, the court held that provision of nutrition was no different
in principle from other kinds of medical treatment and could be
withheld on the same basis, and that discontinuance of treatment was
in principle no different from initial provision of treatment. These are
difficult issues to resolve, and there are no easy answers for them or
answers that are obviously more correct than the court's resolution.
This article will show; however, how the judges on the New Jersey
Supreme Court made these questions easier for themselves-and ulti-
mately too easy, even self-deceptively so-by the way they framed the
questions, by the implicit bias in very language they used to describe
what was at stake.
The essential, though unintended, bias arose from what the
court identified as its "starting point in analyzing whether life-
sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incom-
petent patient."3 This starting point, the court said, was "to determine
what rights a competent patient has to accept or reject medical care.,,4
The court spoke as if this were a self-evident place to begin its analysis;
but it is not. And, moreover, there are significant implications that
follow from this choice of a starting point-implications that are con-
trary to the court's statement of its own intentions.
The court purported to choose this starting point in order first to
identify the rights of a competent person and then to determine how
the same rights could be most nearly vindicated for an incompetent
person, such as Ms. Conroy, who, according to the trial record was
'tonfused and unaware," possibly 'tapable of experiencing pain" but
then again possibly not capable (on this issue Ms. Conroy's physicians
were confused and unaware about her true status).5 The Justices'
professed concern here was to guard against invidious discrimination
against incompetent people, and they were explicit in acknowledging
the existence of an impulse in our society to impose such discrimi-
nations. They spoke particularly about abuses and discriminations
against institutionalized, elderly people like Ms. Conroy. 6 But, without
realizing this, the court's own analysis itself had powerful and ulti-
mately dispositive discriminatory implications.
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By invoking a competent person as its starting-point, and insis-
ting that Ms. Conroy be given "the same rights" as if she were com-
petent, the court implicitly revealed its devaluation of, and its in-
vidious discriminatory attitude toward, incompetent people. In effect,
the court said that competent people are the norm in this society and
incompetent people should be treated as if they could attain-or at
least could approximate-this highly valued norm.
The court's implicit devaluation of incompetency was revealed in
an almost off-handed observation in its opinion regarding the kinds of
evidence that would be developed in trial proceedings that the court
mandated to determine the incompetent person's intent regarding
treatment. A competent person, of course, could simply announce his
or her intent; an incompetent could not. But in order to draw as close
an approximation as possible between the competent and incompetent
person, the court called for evidence not only regarding any earlier
(competent) statements by the now-incompetent person but also re-
garding the person's current condition. It is here that the court made
this revealing aside; evidence should be gathered, the court said, about
numerous aspects of the "patient's condition, treatment and progno-
sis," including evidence about the "degree of humiliation, depen-
dence, and loss of dignity probably resulting from the condition and
treatment. ,,7
There is a contradictory tension in this statement. On the one
hand, the court seemed to acknowledge that there are varying degrees
of "humiliation, dependence and loss of dignity" that might afflict
incompetent people; it called merely for inquiry into the question
without expressing any definitive judgment. But, on the other hand,
the court's very formulation of the question clearly implied that "hu-
miliation, dependence and loss of dignity" were virtually synonymous
with one another. In the court's vocabulary, that is, "dependence" was
inextricably linked with "humiliation" and "loss of dignity." This is
the underlying meaning of, the underlying impetus that arises from,
the court's analytic starting point that competency is the normal state,
the valued status-because incompetency is inevitably humiliating
and undignified.
This conviction is even more starkly revealed in a separate opin-
ion in Conroy by Justice Alan Handler. He purported to take a different
starting point from the court's. "It would be amiss," he said, "in the
context relevant to Miss Conroy's situation, to stress notions of indi-
vidual privacy or autonomy in measuring a person's best interests"
7Id. at 1231.
HeinOnline -- 2 Issues L. & Med. 320 1986-1987
320 Issues in Law & Medicine, Volume 2, Number 4, 1987
because she can neither "presently choose" nor had she ever previously
"reliably indicated" her views or preferred choices in the matter.8 But
notwithstanding his initial and clear-sighted acknowledgment that
Ms. Conroy's views could not reliably be known by anyone, at the
crucial moment of choice, Justice Handler ascribed views to her and
thereby pulled a wooly obscurity over his own analysis. Here is the
crucial paragraph, which is quoted directly:9
The medical and nursing treatment in extremis and suffering
from these conditions entails the constant and extensive han-
dling and manipulation of the body. At some point, such a course
of treatment upon the insensate patient is bound to touch the
sensibilities of even the most detached observer. Eventually, per-
vasive bodily intrusions, even for the best motives, will arouse
feelings akin to humiliation and mortification for the helpless
patient. When cherished values of human dignity and personal
privacy, which belong to every person living or dying, are suf-
ficiently transgressed by what is being done to the individual, we
should be ready to say: enough.
Justice Handler is passionate in his eloquence here, and his
imagery vividly evokes hospital intensive care units or long-term nurs-
ing homes where patients lay honeycombed with tubes and wired to
machinery. But for all his eloquence, there is the same underlying
equation-even more openly stated than in the court's opinion-in
Handler's opinion that "helplessness" is in itself "humiliating" and
"mortifying." Why should this be so? Why should "the sensibilities"-
as Justice Handler put it-of '~ven the most detached observer" (even,
one might thus say, a detached and impartial Supreme Court Justice)
be "touched" by this course of treatment, by "the constant and exten-
sive handling and manipulation of the body."
One cannot resist a psychological speculation here: that the
specter of "extensive handling" and the passivity implied by this
handling is distasteful to someone who is accustomed only to being
active, accustomed not to being handled but to being a handler-per-
haps even a Justice Handler. Whatever such speculation is worth about
Justice Handler himself, a deep fear of passivity and dependence
pervades the court's opinion in Conroy-and, moreover, is at the core
of our legal system's current response to these issues generally.
Aversion is not the only conceivable response to passivity. "Hu-
miliation" and "loss of dignity" are not necessarily synonymous with
'<:iependence." Passivity, dependence, constant handling-all of this
BId. at 1246.
9Id. at 1250.
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can evoke images of childhood and infancy when passivity, de-
pendence, and constant handling is the normal state of affairs and
when, for most of us, our needs were met with loving and attentive
nurturance. These images cannot be found in the Conroy opinions,
however. They are missing because of a general phenomenon in our
society: that we have no confidence in the nurturant potential in our
common social life. However adequately and lovingly we were treated
as children, there is a widespread belief today that no equivalent
caretaking is reliably available to us as adults.
This belief is not based on fantasy. There is regrettable con-
firmation for this belief in the actual conditions in nursing homes and
in other bureaucratically organized caretaking institutions-hospi-
tals, mental illness and retardation institutions and the like. These
institutions are not the primary locus of caretaking for most elderly or
seriously impaired adults in our society; the family network and
various kinds of home care are still the most prevalent formats for
long-term social caretaking arrangements. But the impersonal, bu-
reaucratic institution has become the dominant social caretaking im-
age of our time, and this image is more fearful than consoling for most
of us.
This fear frames the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
Conroy and provides its vocabulary. There are good reasons for this
fear; but, as realistically based as it may be, the fear itself will tend to
distort the judges' good intentions in Conroy. The likelihood of this
distortion is the central problem arising from Conroy and from similar
judicial decisions rendered during the past decade that authorize the
withholding of medical treatment from gravely ill people.
Twenty years ago or even less, many physicians regularly acted to
withhold treatment from patients in extreme states of disability like
Ms. Conroy, usually by failing to administer aggressive regimens of
antibiotics in response to respiratory ailments (colloquially known
then as the 'bId person's friend" for ending lives obviously afflicted by
other slowly progressive but incurable illnesses). Sometimes these
physicians acted in consultation with families, sometimes wholly on
their own; there is no clearly reliable documentation on the extent of or
bases for this past practice. 10 But it is clear that many physicians today
view any such practice as legally risky, if not ethically improper, and
are eager to transfer decision-making responsibility to courts.
The courts have not, however, accepted this proferred re-
lOSee PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 186-87 (1983).
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sponsibility-or, to put the matter more precisely (and more truly
confusingly), courts recently have purported to accept this re-
sponsibility but in a way that effectively denies it. This is the true
import of the Conroy decision. It is the underlying implication of the
court's premise that the starting point for its analysis was the "truly
competent patient." The court thus said, in effect, "we judges do not
have the authority (or responsibility) to decide whether treatment
should be continued or withheld; only the patient has that authority
(and responsibility)."l1 The court indeed relied on its ruling a decade
earlier in the Quinlan case that the Constitution dictated that patients
themselves must be the sole locus for this decisionmaking. 12 As in the
Quinlan case, however, this reliance on constitutional principle in
Conroy was awkward at best; because Karen Quinlan was apparently
in a "persistent vegetative state" as Claire Conroy was irreversibly
demented, neither could speak for herself to assert or even to define
their "right of privacy" to which the court purported to defer.
Undaunted by this misfit between its invoked constitutional
principle and the case at hand, the court in Quinlan constructed an
obviously fictitious person to "stand for" or symbolize Karen Quinlan
by authorizing her father to exercise "substituted judgment" for her-
that is, to pretend that he was her in deciding whether to continue
treatment. 13In Conroy, the court ultimately reached this same fictitious
result, though by a more circumlocutory route. The court mandated
inquiry into whether Ms. Conroy had directly expressed any wishes
regarding medical treatment when she had been competent (its so-
called "subjective test")14; or, if not, whether she had indirectly or
implicited expressed views on the question (its so-called "limited-
objective test," thus overruling its earlier holding in Quinlan eschew-
ing this kind of speculative evidence).15
Finally, if even such bits and pieces of evidence to invent a
"responsible decision-making individual" were wholly absent, the
court then embraced a so-called "pure-objective test."16 But even here
the Justices held back from acknowledging that they or any judge
rather than "the individual patient" would be taking responsibility for
the decision. Instead the court insisted that the existence of "pain"
111d. at 192.
121n re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39-40, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
1370 N.J. at 41-42. For a discussion of the impossible mental gymnastics required by
this court-mandated pretense in the Quinlan case, see R. BURT, TAKING CAREOF STRANG-
ERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 152 (1979).
14486 A.2d at 1231.
IS1d. at 1232.
161d.
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would be the sole determinant on which a decision could be reached.
The court thus ignored the fact, amply demonstrated in the extensive
trial testimony in both Conroy and Quinlan, that the existence of "pain"
was a subjective proposition that could not reliably be gauged by
anyone regarding people in vegetative states such as Karen Quinlan or
in severe demented conditions such as Claire Conroy.
Justice Handler, in his separate opinion, clearly identified this
fallacy in the court's reasoning. 17 He then, however, immediately em-
braced an equivalent fallacy by opining that Ms. Conroy's treatment
should be discontinued because her '~xtensive handling" and "per-
vasive bodily intrusions ... arouse[d] feelings akin to humiliation and
mortification for the helpless patient."lB Handler thus made explicit
what was only implicit in the majority's opinion-that helplessness,
that extreme dependency, was in itself "painful." Though Handler
came closer than the majority to admitting that this was his viewpoint
rather than the inevitable attitude of every helplessly dependent per-
son, at the last moment he based his decision, as he put it, on "cher-
ished values of human dignity and personal privacy" even though the
person in question had not indicated that she cherished or construed
those values as this judge would. 19 Handler thus constructed a fic-
titious Claire Conroy to be the embodiment of the social values and
the underlying mistrust of dependency and he purported to defer to
"her."
All of the Justices in Conroy thus followed the same evasive
maneuver that Claire Conroy's physicians had initially embraced: to
deny direct personal responsibility for making a treatment decision
regarding a person who was unable to decide for herself. It seems
moreover, that the judicial denial of responsibility was most likely
motivated by the same mistrust of institutionalized caretaking that
apparently has led so many contemporary physicians to yield
decision-making authority to the courts. The judges in Conroy were
skeptical that the best interests of seriously ill people would be ade-
quately protected by our society's formally institutionalized care-
taking arrangements (especially, as they explicitly noted, the interests
of elderly nursing home residents). They were also skeptical of their
own capacity to protect the interests of such people. Thus the court
majority held tightly to the proposition that, if a person's wishes could
not be discerned, the only justified basis for a judicial order termi-
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ests" would be in response to that person's demonstrated "recurring,
unavoidable and severe pain."20
There is an admirable caution and modesty in the Justices' refusal
to accept authority to withhold treatment based on an open-
ended judicial declaration of a seriously ill person's "best interests"
and in their insistence that any such decision be narrowly constrained
by some such standard as "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain". It
is their obvious cautious modesty that leads one to conclude that the
Justices were motivated by skepticism about their own caretaking
capacities-a realistic skepticism amply confirmed by long experi-
ence, for one example, of judicial failure adequately to protect vulner-
able people under civil commitment laws. 21 But much as one may
admire the Justices' modest disclaimers in Conroy, they were not suf-
ficiently rigorous or sufficiently self-critical in their skepticism.
Though the Justices tried to constrain themselves, the standards
they invoked are inadequate instruments for any assured self-
constraint. The standards of "pain" or of "individual privacy" and
"dignity" have no reliably objective content; they are virtual invita-
tions to paste fictitious subjective attributes on a "person" who never
existed as such. By virtue of this attribution, moreover, medical treat-
ment will be withheld and this nonexistent person will thus vanish in
the very act of its fictional creation. All of this will transpire so
smoothly, with such elaborately judicialized due process, that no
one-neither judges, physicians, and families immediately involved
nor more detached social observers-will see the essential ficti-
tiousness of the entire transaction.
All of the 'tompetent" participants, both immediate and more
remote, will thus make decisions for the "incompetent" that will
obscure the continued and even more urgent reasons for mistrusting
institutionalized caretaking. Though this mistrust pervades Conroy,
the basic concern is that the court's result will be viewed as a solution to
the problem that formally institutionalized caretakers cannot be
trusted. If the Justices had been more rigorous in their appreciation of
the bases for this mistrust, they would have understood that it cannot
be resolved and that the very effort to do so will most likely exacerbate
the problem.
There are hints of the way this exacerbation will occur in the
20Id. at 1232.
2ICf Parham v. }.R., 99 5.Ct. 2493, 2508 & n.17 (1979) ("the supposed protections of
an adversary proceeding ... (in civil commitments) may well be more illusory than
real", citing studies of judicial hearings that reveal a mean hearing time ranging from
3.8 to 9.2 minutes).
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Conroy opinions themselves. The first hint obiquely appears in the
majority opinion's reference to the New Jersey Supreme Court's prior
decision in the Quinlan case. In the course of appearing simply to
describe the factual background of that case, the majority said, "Ms.
Quinlan had been placed on a respirator.... The unanimous opinion
of all the doctors was that Ms. Quinlan would die if the respirator were
removed.,,22 In fact, after the court authorized it and the respirator was
removed, Karen Quinlan did not die but survived in her persistent
vegetative state for almost nine years. The court's indirect and seem-
ingly casual reference to this diagnostic error has an aura of special
pleading, as if the court were saying, "It wasn't our fault. We simply
relied on the 'unanimous opinion of all the doctors'." This is, however,
a false reading of the case; there was in fact conflict in the testimony of
the physicians at the original trial on the question whether Ms. Quin-
lan could survive once removed from the respirator. 23 The trial judge
chose to believe the testifying physicians who were, as it turned out,
wrong.
The physicians' error might have been reasonable, and the judge's
reliance on their erroneous testimony might similarly have been rea-
sonable, but the New Jersey Supreme Court misremembered-in their
eagerness to absolve themselves from responsibility for a faulty care-
taking decision. In one sense, this small deception by the Justices (a
self-deception, it would appear) reflects the same flight from re-
sponsibility based on the same underlying mistrust of their caretaking
capacities found elsewhere in their opinion. But, in a further sense,
this particular deception reveals a specific responsibility-avoidance
technique that will become generalized in future cases: an uncritical
deference to physicians that obscures from the judges themselves that
such deference is unjustified because the physicians have no firmer
basis for confidence in their caretaking capacities (in their diagnostic
and treatment skills or their underlying motives) than judges who
have reluctantly found themselves thrust into these matters. 24 In this
small but eloquent descriptive error regarding the Quinlan case, it is as
if the Justices are saying to the medical profession, "You have come to
court for us to make these treatment decisions because you doubt
society's trust in you. But we judges will continue to rely on you; we
judges have no choice but to trust you, even when you are wrong."
This same attitude is more directly revealed-though still hidden
from casual discovery-by Justice Handler in his separate opinion. In
22486 A. 2d at 1227.
23See Burt, supra note 13, at 153-54.
24See J. KATZ. THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 165-206 (1984).
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a prefatory observation, Handler stated that, because "the funda-
mental interests of helpless persons are at stake, ... it becomes a
judicial responsibility to intercede "25 He then cited a recent
California appellate court decision, Barber v. Superior Court,26 for its
presumed recognition of this responsibility. That court, Handler
stated, "recognized that it would be derelict in [its] duty if [it] did not
provide some general guidelines for future conduct in the absence of
... legislation to protect the best interests of incompetent helpless,
terminal individuals. ,,27
There is considerable and revealing irony in Justice Handler's
citation of this California decision. In that case, the court dismissed a
criminal prosecution brought against two physicians for discon-
tinuing tubal feeding from a patient two days after he had been
removed from a respirator and five days after he had suffered cardio-
respiratory arrest while in the hospital recovery room immediately
following surgery for an unrelated condition. These physicians had
advised the patient's wife and children within three days of his post-
operative cardiac arrest that he had suffered severe brain damage that
would most likely leave him in a permanent vegetative state and these
family members drafted a document requesting discontinuance of "all
machines ... that are sustaining life.,,2s The local prosecutor sub-
sequently obtained criminal indictments based on the following con-
cerns: that the time lapse between the cardiac arrest and the termi-
nation of treatment was too short to make any definitive diagnosis of
irreversable brain damage, that the physicians' willingness to act so
swiftly raised a suspicion that they were trying to mask the possible
misfeasance of their hospital colleagues in providing postoperative
care to the patient, and these suspicions were compounded by the fact
that the patient, on entering the hospital, had appeared to designate
his sister-in-law as a surrogate decisionmaker, but she was never
consulted regarding treatment withdrawal. 29
The California trial court sustained the indictment on the
grounds that there was sufficient reason to suspect a criminal of-
fense, but the appellate court reversed. The basis for this reversal was
set out in the court's opinion directly following the passage cited by
Justice Handler regarding judicial duty to provide "some general
guidelines for future conduct." But contrary to Handler's account of
25486 A.2d at 1246.
26147 Cal.App.3d 1006, 195 Cal.Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983).
27486 A.2d at 1247.
28195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
29Id. at 493 n.2.
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this passage, the California court did not purport to act in order "to
protect the best interests of incompetent helpless, terminaJ.individu-
als." The California court acted, by its own account, for the following
purpose:30
[T]here must be a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of their
healing vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or
self-protection concerns which would inhibit their independent
medical judgments for the well-being of their dying patients.
We would hope that this opinion might be serviceable to some
degree in ameliorating the professional problems under
discussion.
Thus, contrary to Justice Handler's bowlderized version, the Cali-
fornia court did not claim to act "to protect the best interests of
incompetent helpless, terminal individuals." That court acted "to free
physicians" from threats to their "self-interest or self-protection" that
might arise if they were held accountable in criminal prosecutions for
their possible misconduct in terminating treatment of "incompetent,
helpless, terminal individuals." (There is, moreover, the further irony
that the California court's statement ignored by Justice Handler was a
direct quotation from the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
the Quinlan case.?! By thus unmasking Justice Handler's description of
the California court's motivation, we have a vivid depiction of the
dynamic that lies beneath the surface verbiage of the Conroy decision
and that threatens to undermine its supposed beneficent purposes. In
the ostensible service of incompetent, helpless people, the courts will
in fact act to protect physicians.
Justice Handler made the point in yet another distorted citation
of a sister state court opinion. The judicial task, he said, "can be viewed
as 'establishing a framework in the law on which the activities of health
care personnel and other persons' can be guided so as to act in the best
interest of the patient."32 Handler was quoting here from a Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court decision, Superintendent v. Saikewicz,33
approving the withholding of cancer treatment from a retarded man
notwithstanding that all mentally normal people would have opted for
such treatment. In fact, however, in the passage cited by Justice Han-
dler, the Massachusetts court did not claim to guide the activities of
health care personnel; that court conceived its "task of establishing a
WId. at 49l.
31355 A.2d at 668.
32486 A.2d at 1247.
33373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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framework ... on which the activities of health care personnel ... can
find support". 34
These variations between Justice Handler's citations and the
actual court decisions may seem to be small matters. But these verbal
differences reveal the deep tensions beneath the surface assurance of
the Justice's opinion. The issue of trust in caretakers is the key. Justice
Handler and his colleagues in Conroy revealed, in their equation of
"helplessness" and "humiliation," their mistrust of the nurturant ca-
pacity of social caretaking institutions. But in Handler's disguised
"support" for physicians (in the ostensible service of 'guiding" them
and protecting "helpless" patients), the Justice further showed an
impulse to override, to disregard, his mistrust. There is here the same
impetus toward uncritical deference toward physicians, and the same
suppression of doubts about whether this deference is truly deserved,
that was revealed in the same small way in the Conroy majority's
reliance on the supposed "unanimous opinion of all the doctors" in
Karen Quinlan's case.
These small hints in Conroy of uncritical and undeserved defer-
ence, and of suppressed doubts, regarding physicians as caretakers
were greatly magnified in the California and Massachusetts decisions
that Justice Handler cited. It is of course possible that the physicians in
Barber, the California case, acted with adequate deliberation and were
guided solely by the incompetent patient's interests and his immediate
family's wishes rather than acting with unseemly haste to protect their
professional self-interest; it is possible that the physicians in Saikewicz,
the Massachusetts case, acted to save their retarded patient from
needless and otherwise unavoidable suffering rather than because
they valued his life less than a mentally normal person. The quick
foreclosure of judicial scrutiny in both cases, however, raises rather
than resolves doubt on these scores. In the California case, the fore-
closure was obvious in the dismissal of the indictment without any
trial. In the Massachusetts case, the foreclosure was less obvious since
the court conducted an inquiry before authorizing nontreatment, but
the desultory character of that inquiry was nonetheless apparent. 35 For
reasons that I have set out in an earlier work, moreover, the very format
of advanced judicial or administrative review of decisions to withhold
treatment will most likely serve to suppress rather than to resolve
doubts, so long as these advanced review processes guarantee absolute
immunity to physicians from any subsequent sanction.36
34370 N.E.2d at 422 (emphasis added).
35See Burt, supra note 13, at 155-58.
36Id.I64-69.
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The critical difficulty in Conroy, as in these other state cases, does
not arise from the judges' underlying mistrust of caretaking institu-
tions but rather from the judges attempts to solve "the problem" of
mistrust, an attempt which may well arise from the intensity of that
mistrust that the judges perceive and fear. This same central difficulty
also afflicts the solution advanced by some who would advocate a rigid
rule that physicians may never withhold nutrition or hydration from
any person under any circumstances. Such rule cannot be justified on
the ground that every conceivable person would always be benefitted
from the prolongation of life by such means; the justification is rather
that permission to withhold such treatment in some cases must neces-
sarily lead to abuse in many other cases. The premise for this rigidity is
mistrust of the bureaucratized network of social caretaking institu-
tions. As sensible as this mistrust may be, the adoption of this rigid
rule to "solve the problem" of mistrust will most likely lead to greater
problems, to more subtle but pervasive abuse of helpless, dependent
people. This is because such a rule would force caretakers to provide
treatment in individual cases that appears to them both pointless and
cruel. Adherence to this rule would, that is, mirror the heartless,
nonnurturant implications of the bureaucratic organization of our
health care system. This rigid rule would quickly become a reiteration
and reinforcement of the very problem it intended to address, and it
would breed other cruelties, other retaliatory inflictions, in its wake.
Adoption and enforcement of such a rule would disregard the age-old
wisdom that the spirit of a law can be life-affirming while adhering to
its letter can be deadly.
What then is the solution to the problem posed by Claire Con-
roy's case? My preference is for courts and legislatures to avoid both
promulgation of clear-cut rules and construction of formal bureau-
cratized procedures either of which, when followed "by the book,"
would immunize caretaking professionals from any prospect of later
sanction. The customary regime should be relied on in which the
immediate parties must act subject to the risk of subsequent public
scrutiny, based on general standards of "good practice" and "ethi-
cal conduct," in civil, criminal, or professional license-revocation
proceedings.
Arguments are elsewhere for this preference.371t is enough here
to say that, however unsatisfying the refusal to provide direct substan-
tive answers and exonerating procedures might be, there are greater
risks for increased abuse inherent both in the formal rules and proce-
dures set out in Conroy and in alternative proposed clear-cut "solu-
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tions" to the problems of treating incompetent, medically dependent
people. All of the currently espoused solutions rest on a deep mistrust
of the possibilities for nurturance in our society which inevitably tends
to imply a corresponding aversion to dependence and to dependent
people. 38 In the very intensity of our contemporary mistrust of social
caretaking, we have created an impossible bind for ourselves-a bind
in which our traditional caretakers, whether physicians or judges, find
themselves driven repeatedly to demonstrate the true depths of our
predicament by proving how unreliable they themselves are as care-
takers. An image keeps recurring: that we have dug a deep hole for
ourselves and that every time we grasp some implement to find a way
out, the tool turns out to be another shovel. Honest acknowledgement
of the predicament seems at least the first, best step.
38See Burt, Legal Reform and Aging: Current Issues, Troubling Trends, in WHAT DOES IT
MEANToGROWOw?108--110(T. Cole&S. Gadoweds., 1986).
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